Physical protection of lattice-Based cryptography - Challenges and solutions - by Khalid, Ayesha et al.
Physical protection of lattice-Based cryptography - Challenges and
solutions -
Khalid, A., O’ Neill, M., Oder, T., Güneysu, T., Valencia, F., & Regazzoni, F. (2018). Physical protection of
lattice-Based cryptography - Challenges and solutions -. In GLSVLSI 2018:  Proceedings of the 2018 Great
Lakes Symposium on VLSI (pp. 365-370). Association for Computing Machinery.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3194554.3194616
Published in:
GLSVLSI 2018:  Proceedings of the 2018 Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to the Association for Computing Machinery.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:05. Apr. 2019
Physical Protection of Lattice-Based Cryptography
- Challenges and Solutions -
Ayesha Khalid
The Queen’s University Belfast,
United Kingdom
a.khalid@qub.ac.uk
Tobias Oder
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
tobias.oder@rub.de
Felipe Valencia
ALaRI - Università Della Svizzera
Italiana, Switzerland
valena@usi.ch
Maire O’ Neill
The Queen’s University Belfast,
United Kingdom
m.oneill@qub.ac.uk
Tim Güneysu
Ruhr-Universität Bochum & DFKI,
Germany
tim.gueneysu@rub.de
Francesco Regazzoni
ALaRI - Università Della Svizzera
Italiana, Switzerland
regazzoni@alari.ch
ABSTRACT
The impending realization of scalable quantum computers will
have a significant impact on today’s security infrastructure. With
the advent of powerful quantum computers public key crypto-
graphic schemes will become vulnerable to Shor’s quantum al-
gorithm, undermining the security current communications sys-
tems. Post-quantum (or quantum-resistant) cryptography is an
active research area, endeavoring to develop novel and quantum
resistant public key cryptography. Amongst the various classes of
quantum-resistant cryptography schemes, lattice-based cryptog-
raphy is emerging as one of the most viable options. Its efficient
implementation on software and on commodity hardware has al-
ready been shown to compete and even excel the performance of
current classical security public-key schemes. This work discusses
the next step in terms of their practical deployment, i.e., addressing
the physical security of lattice-based cryptographic implementa-
tions.We survey the state-of-the-art in terms of side channel attacks
(SCA), both invasive and passive attacks, and proposed counter-
measures. Although the weaknesses exposed have led to counter-
measures for these schemes, the cost, practicality and effectiveness
of these on multiple implementation platforms, however, remains
under-studied.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the societal shift towards the Internet of Things, ensuring
security and privacy for an increasing number of heterogeneous
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
GLSVLSI ’18, May 23–25, 2018, Chicago, IL, USA
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to the
Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5724-1/18/05. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3194554.3194616
connected devices is fast becoming a crucial concern. Moreover,
our current public-key security infrastructure needs a complete
overhaul since its security could be compromised by a scalable
quantum computer in the near future. Quantum computers will be
capable of executing Shor’s algorithm which can, in polynomial
time, break the two hard mathematical problems, i.e., integer factor-
ization and discrete logarithm problem [39], on which RSA and ECC
are based. These public-key schemes are used in today’s security
infrastructure to provide public-key encryption and (authenticated)
key exchange. Reacting to this urgency, much research is now being
conducted into quantum-resilient or post quantum cryptography.
The concern is also reflected by the stance of government agencies,
including NSA and CESG [8, 9, 25, 35]. NSA’s Information Assur-
ance Directorate (IAD) announced a transition to quantum resistant
public-key cryptography in the near future for their Suite B of rec-
ommended algorithms [25]. Also, NIST announced a call requesting
new quantum-resilient algorithm candidates to be considered for
analysis, standardization and eventually, industry adoption [24].
Of the various flavors of quantum-resilient cryptography pro-
posed to date, lattice-based cryptography (LBC) stands out for var-
ious reasons. Firstly, these schemes offer security proofs based
on NP-hard problems with average-case to worst-case hardness.
Secondly, in addition to being quantum-age secure, the LBC imple-
mentations are notable for their efficiency, primarily due to their
inherent linear algebra based matrix/ vector operations on inte-
gers. Thirdly, LBC constructions offer extended functionality for
advanced security services such as identity-based encryption (IBE)
[13] attribute-based encryption (ABE) and fully-homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE) [29], in addition to the basic classical cryptographic
primitives (encryption, signatures, key exchange solutions) needed
in a quantum age [16].
While LBC constructions provide security guarantees in the-
ory, to date, the investigation of LBC implementations resilient to
physical attacks remains understudied. Their realization on con-
temporary computing platforms requires a thorough study of their
resilience, especially in the face of advanced side-channel attack
techniques, both active attacks and fault attacks. This paper sur-
veys the state of the art in physical attacks and countermeasures
undertaken for LBC to date on software and hardware platforms. A
significant number of attacks undertaken for non-post-quantum
cryptography can be directly applicable in the LBC context, and
further vulnerabilities exposed by the inherent structures of LBC
schemes need to also be investigated.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 gives a background
of LBC proposals and their key components. Section 3 summarizes
the state of the art in physical attacks reported against LBC con-
structions. Section 4 discusses countermeasure proposals to date
against these attacks while Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Lattice-Based Primitives
Lattices are objects in n-dimensional Euclidean space characterized
by a regular arrangement of points. More precisely, a lattice in Rn
generated by the basis B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn}, is defined as L(B) =
{Bx, x ∈ Zn}.
A number of hard mathematical problems are used to construct
lattice-based schemes. The most commonly used problem is the
Learning with Errors problem (LWE) which involves finding a
vector s when given a matrix A and a vector b = As + e where
e is a small (unknown) error vector. Other popular mathematical
problems used to construct lattice-based schemes include the Short
Integer Solution (SIS) or NTRU lattices.
There are three classes of lattices that are relevant for cryp-
tography. Schemes that are based on LWE are standard or ran-
dom lattice-based schemes. These schemes have in common that
they require computations with large matrices that either need a
lot of memory or require costly on-the-fly computations. A fur-
ther issue with standard lattice-based schemes is that they require
matrix-vector multiplication with quadratic complexity. Ideal or
ring lattice-based schemes are an alternative to standard lattices.
The major difference between these classes of lattices is that the
matrix that is used in standard lattices is represented by a single
row in ring lattices. The remaining rows are generated by cyclic
shifts of the first row. Therefore ideal lattice-based schemes are
more efficient as they require less memory and the main arithmetic
operation is polynomial multiplication instead of matrix-vector
multiplication. With the help of the number-theoretic transform
(NTT) polynomial multiplication can be accelerated to have a com-
plexity of O (n logn). In the case of ring lattices the security of the
constructed schemes is based on ring variants of the original prob-
lems, hence, the Ring-Learning with Errors (R-LWE) or Ring-Short
Integer Solution (R-SIS) are the underlying problems used in these
schemes.
While ideal lattice-based schemes are more efficient, the addi-
tional structure in the lattice might also be exploitable by attacks.
So far no strong attack is known that exploits the ring structure or
that is better than other attacks that work on standard lattices as
well. To have a trade-off between the efficiency of ideal lattices and
the trust in the security of standard lattices,module lattices were
introduced. The difference between module lattices and standard
lattices is that in module lattices the matrix has small dimensions
and the coefficients of the matrix are no longer simple integers but
entire polynomials. Therefore the number-theoretic transform can
still be used for efficient polynomial multiplication. The security of
module lattice-based schemes is once again based on variants of the
original mathematical problems, e.g. Module-LWE or Module-SIS.
As one of the first lattice-based cryptosystems Hoffstein, Pipher,
and Silverman introduced the encryption scheme NTRU [14] in
1998 which is based on ring lattices. To date the encryption scheme
NTRUEncrypt has withstood cryptanalytic scrutiny provided pa-
rameters are chosen correctly, but the NTRU-based digital signa-
ture scheme is considered broken. However, a modified version
version of the signature scheme has been submitted to the NIST
post-quantum call, along with many other proposals.
Table 1 presents a summary of the lattice-based schemes sub-
mitted to the NIST standardization process [24] and their related
classes of lattices. Out of a total of 69 submissions to the NIST call
for post quantum cryptographic proposals for digital signatures and
KEM/encryption schemes, 26 are lattice-based proposals. Note that
some schemes base their security on multiple assumptions. There
are also two submissions based on polynomial lattices. This class
is very similar to ring lattices and for power-of-two dimensions
even equivalent. The table also shows for which key exchange
(KEM)/ public key encryption (PKE) schemes the authors claim
CCA or CCA2 security in addition to CPA security (which was a
requirement for the NIST call). CPA security means that the scheme
is mathematically secure against an attacker who has access to a
limited amount of plaintext/ciphertext pairs. CCA security on the
other hand implies that an attacker has access to a decryption ora-
cle as well. This security can be extended by assuming an adaptive
attacker (CCA2).
For most submitted signature schemes the authors claim EUF-
CMA security, whichmeans that a signature is existentially unforge-
able under chosen-message attacks. This means that an attacker
with access to a signing oracle is unable to forge a valid signature
of a new message. Strong existential unforgeability under Chosen
Message Attacks (SEUF-CMA) is an even stronger security notion
that also assumes that an attacker is unable to forge a different
signature of a message that he has already seen.
2.2 Basic Blocks for Lattice-Based
Cryptography
From an architectural point of view, the key components in lattice
based cryptography typically include the calculation of a series of
linear algebraic operations and the sampling of values from a dis-
crete Gaussian-distributed random source. For signatures it is ben-
eficial to apply compression techniques (e.g., Huffman encoding) if
transmission size reduction is more critical than processing cost. For
ideal lattices, polynomial multiplication is typically realized using
the number-theoretic transform (NTT). It is a fast Fourier transform
(FFT) over a finite field where the n coefficients pass through logn
butterfly operations. Many lattice-based cryptosystems require dis-
crete Gaussian distribution for noise generation. In addition to the
traditional rejection sampling, several other optimized techniques
have been proposed including Bernoulli, Cumulative Distribution
Table (CDT) sampling (inversion sampling), Knuth-Yao sampling,
discrete Ziggurat sampling. All of these schemes have advantages
depending on the target application, and hence tackling their vul-
nerability to side-channel attacks is critical. Random oracles needed
by LBC constructions are generally instantiated by cryptographic
hash functions, such as ChaCha20, SHA256, or the expandable
output function (XOF) SHAKE-128.
Lattice Schemes
Type KEM/PKE Signatures
Standard
Ramstake1 DRS
Odd Manhattan1
LOTUS2
Compact LWE2
Giophantus
FrodoKEM 1
Lizard1
Ring, Round 21
Standard KCL1
EMBELM/R. EMBELM
Ring
NTRU Prime2 qTESLA
NTRU Encrypt2 FALCON
Ding Key
KINDI 1
LIMA1
New Hope1
HILA5
NTRU-RSS-KEM
Mersenne-756839
Ring, pqNTRUsign
Module
Module CRYSTALS KYBER
2 CRYSTALS DILITHIUM 3
SABER 1
Three Bears 1
Polynomial Titanium
1
LAC1
Table 1: Lattice based proposals submitted to NIST post
quantum crytpography call
[1] IND-CCA Security
[2] IND-CCA2 Security
[3] sEUF-CMA security
3 PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON LATTICE-BASED
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Physical attacks against lattice based constructions is a research
direction largely unexplored. This is mainly due to the fact that lat-
tice based constructions themselves are relatively new and several
parameters of the algorithms are still under scrutiny. However, a
comprehensive analysis of their resistance against physical attacks
is of utmost importance for their widespread deployment. A deep
understanding of the physical attack resistance of these construc-
tion is also a fundamental parameter for the NIST standardization
process. In the reminder of the section, we will introduce the most
common physical attacks (timing attacks, power analysis attacks,
and fault attacks) and we summarize how they have been applied
to lattice based constructions.
3.1 Timing Attacks
Timing attacks were first introduced by Kocher [22], they exploit
the differences in time required by a device to perform specific
operations, such as the non-constant time to execute two differ-
ent instructions, different data fetch times due to cache memory
hit/miss, programs behavior due to branching, optimizations lead-
ing to skipping of unnecessary operations, etc.
The first work discussing timing attacks on lattice-based cryp-
tography is the one of Silverman and Whyte [40]. They mounted
a timing attack an implementation of NTRUEncrypt. The attack
exploits the difference in the decryption time taken by different
(possibly bogus) ciphertexts since they all may require different
number of calls to the hash function. To mount the attack, the
adversary performs a variable number of pre-computations, and
then submits a relatively small number of specially constructed
ciphertexts for decryption, measuring the decryption times. Com-
parison of the decryption times with the precomputed data enables
the attacker to recover the key in a much reduced time compared
to standard attacks on NTRUEncrypt. Reported results show that
for specific parameter sets, an attacker can recover a single key
with approximately half of the key bits of effort. The work high-
lights possible ways to prevent the attack by ensuring a constant
number of SHA calls. In [45], Vizev exploited the differing number
of hash calls to mount timing side-channel attacks. The proposed
countermeasure consists of a padding scheme, which helps ensure
a constant timing of operations. A constant time sampler was also
used in [6] for key-exchange in the transport layer security (TLS)
protocol, based on a R-LWE implementation.
The discrete Gaussian samplers have been shown to be espe-
cially vulnerable against the timing attacks. Timing channel was
exploited, where the information leaked via cache memory by a
CDT based Gaussian sampler was successfully extracted [7]. To
disentangle the link between timing information and the samples,
Roy et. al proposed the use of a Fisher-Yates [11] shuffling algo-
rithm [36, 37]. Saarinen [38] later suggested the shuffling be carried
out twice on the set of independently generated samples, before
summation. Recent research shows that relying solely on two-stage
shuffling may not be sufficient to protect against SCA attacks [27].
Consequently, multiple sampling and shuffling stages together with
the use of different convolution parameters are recommended to
ensure adequate protection [27, 28].
3.2 Power Analysis Attacks
These attacks extract secret information by analyzing correlations
between the un-intentional power leakage of a target device and
the secret values processed during the algorithm execution. In
simple power analysis (SPA), the adversary uses a limited set of
power traces (possibly as few as one). One example is the single
trace attack by Primas et al. [30] in which the authors exploit that
the DIV instruction of an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller takes a
varying number of cycles to finish depending on the data that is
processed. The attacked implementation uses the DIV instruction in
the modular reduction in the decryption of the R-LWE encryption
scheme. The attack is able to fully recover the secret key.
The Differential power analysis (DPA) attacks are much more
powerful since they collect many power traces instead to success-
fully suppress noise and statistically compare a single hypothetical
values (First-order DPA) or multiple hypothetical values simulta-
neously (Higher-order DPA) with the measured power traces. In
contrast to SPA, DPA targets the processed data of the implementa-
tion. Atici et al. presented the first power analysis attacks on NTRU
in [3], targeting implementations on RFIDs. This was followed by
Lee et al. [23], who considered first and second-order DPA attacks
on NTRU. The attacks were based on the leakage of Hamming
distance information, generated during the computation of the con-
volution product. To prevent these attacks the authors proposed
to randomize the operation order an add a random value before
the computation of the convolution product (a main operation in
NTRU) and subtract this value later. This countermeasure is called
blinding.
In [46], Wang et al. considered the countermeasure proposals
of [23] and suggested that blinding during the computation of the
convolution products was not sufficient. A DPA was described to
exploit the calculation of intermediate values. They exploit that
an attacker can trigger decryptions of invalid ciphertexts. Even
though illegal intermediate values would be generated, and these
values would be prohibited from being output, their calculation
during convolution processing stages would still be recordable in
the power consumption measurements. The authors then proposed
alternative countermeasures, based on random delay insertions, an
alternative masking scheme and the use of dummy operations. The
authors did not give any indication relating to the performance loss
due to the in corporation of these countermeasures.
DPA and SPA are well understood by the community and there-
fore every implementation of a cryptographic scheme that does
not utilize dedicated countermeasures against DPA and SPA is ex-
pected to leak secret information. The majority of the research
therefore focuses on countermeasures for LBC instead of attacks
against implementation of LBC.
3.3 Fault Attacks
For a fault attack the adversary purposely induces a fault and ex-
ploits the erroneous behavior of the circuit to gain information
about the secret values in the cryptosystem. These errors are typi-
cally transient in nature, hence the faults propagate through the cir-
cuit leaving the device operating normally. The attacks are termed
as first order faults attacks if the adversary can induce no more than
a single fault in the system. The fault injection is shown to be initi-
ated by varying the supply voltage, system clock speed or ambient
temperatures, etc. [1, 2]. A further class of invasive attacks were
introduced by Skorobogatov in [41, 42], with the use of destructive
ion beams and semi-permanent optical fault injection techniques;
the faults being shown to induce effects such as changing the val-
ues of internal registers, incorrect branching of the program or the
skipping of program instructions.
A fault analysis attack against NTRUEncrypt was presented in
[17] by Kamal and Youssef, where the fault model assumed the at-
tacker is able to inject faults into the coefficients of the second step
of the decryption process. Where NTRU Encrypt is implemented
with parameters (N,p,q), the attack is shown to be successful with
probability ≈ 1 − 1/p. In [20], Kamal and Youssef proposed meth-
ods for strengthening hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt
against fault analysis attacks using error detection codes and dupli-
cation of the decryption operation, using a rotated version of the
ciphertext in a redundant computation.
A scan based side-channel attack on NTRU Encrypt was demon-
strated in [19], where the scan chain structure of the polynomial
multiplication circuits was extracted, thus enabling the secret key
to be retrieved. Kamal and Youssef also presented a fault analysis
of the NTRU Sign digital signature scheme in [18], where it is as-
sumed that the attacker is able to inject a transient fault into the
coefficients of the polynomials in the signing algorithm. When the
attacker is also able to skip the norm-bound signature check, the
attack requires only one fault for success.
In [4], Bindel et al. investigated the vulnerability and resistance
of multiple lattice-based signature schemes including BLISS, ring-
TESLA and GLP signatures. They considered the first order ran-
domizing, zeroing, and skipping faults and found effective attacks
against all the signature schemes. All three schemes were found
vulnerable against zeroing faults during the signing and verifica-
tion, against skipping faults during the key generation, against two
kinds of skipping faults during the verification. The work also sug-
gested optimised code modifications as countermeasures against
these attacks.
In [44], Valencia et al. discuss the vulnerability of R-LWE encryp-
tion against fault attacks. The work explored several possible fault
injection effects, including single bit flip, single bit zeroing, and skip
instructions and examines the consequences and the possibility of
recover secret data.
In [10], Espitau et al. investigated the implication of early Loop
abort Faults for various stages of lattice based signature schemes
including BLISS, GLP, TESLA and the GPV scheme. For BLISS (and
the rest of the Fiat-Shamir family signatures), an early termination
of the generation loop for the random commitment element (y1)
enables a full recovery of the secret key value s1. For GPV signature
schemes too, reconstruction of the entire secret key is possible
by an early loop abort fault considered for the Gaussian sample
generation during signature calculation [10].
4 COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PHYSICAL
ATTACKS
This section surveys the countermeasures suggested to protect
against the major physical attack vulnerabilities reported to date
in LBC constructions. These countermeasures are generally device
and attack specific, i.e., some custom hardware vulnerabilities and
countermeasures might not be directly applicable to software im-
plementations and vice versa. Moreover, the countermeasures may
exhibit side-effects exploitable by an adversary, as shown by Regaz-
zoni et al. in [31, 32] where an error detection/correction circuit may
aid an adversary by increasing the available exploitable information.
The automated application of power/timing attack countermeasures
in gate level netlists [12, 43], that has been developed for current
cryptographic schemes, is in general also applicable to lattice based
circuits.
4.1 Countermeasures against Timing Attacks
The simplest countermeasure against timing attacks is to ensure
that the execution time of an implementation is independent of the
secret data that is processed. However, especially in the context of
a Gaussian sampler, it is often expensive to have a constant-time
implementation. There are several possible algorithms that utilise
uniform numbers to return Gaussian distributed numbers and they
differ from each other in terms of implementation speed, memory,
and precision. Constant-time hardware architectures for a wide
range of samplers have been proposed [15, 21]. However, to date
such proposals have been designed on a case-by-case basis and as
yet there has been no proposal of a generic hardware design. The
binomial sampler is inherently protected against timing attacks.
However, as it only samples from a binomial distribution instead of
an exact Gaussian distribution it can only be used in encryption and
key exchange schemes as the security proof in signature schemes
requires the sampler to have a high precision. To avoid an expensive
constant-time Gaussian sampler, shuffling has also been proposed
as a countermeasure [36].
4.2 Countermeasures against Power Analysis
Hiding and masking are two commonly used countermeasures
against power analysis attacks. While masking tries to avoid the
fact that at any point in time a secret value is stored in a register
(and thus could be detected by collecting a large amount of traces),
hiding uses randomization to increase the noise. While masking
schemes can be provably secure as countermeasures against DPA,
hiding usually makes DPA more difficult, but does not entirely
prevent it. Hiding is better suited as countermeasure against SPA.
The essential goal of hiding is remove the correlation from the
data computed by the device and the power consumed by the de-
vice during that computation. The most straightforward way of
achieving this is to impose that an implementation must consume
constant power, however, this, in practice, is extremely hard to be
achieved. Another possible approach to realize hiding is to shuffle
the order of the executed operations as shown in [27] and [36].
Especially for hardware implementations, it is also possible to in-
stantiate noise generators on the FPGA or ASIC to make it more
difficult for an attacker to extract the secret information from the
power trace.
The idea of masking is to split the secret value into uniformly
random shares and perform computations on each share individu-
ally so that an attacker needs to know every share to reconstruct
the secret value. First order masking splits the secret value into two
shares (i.e. with a single probe, the attacker cannot gain knowledge
about the secret value).
Lee et al. [23] proposed three countermeasures to protect NTRU,
with the aim of thwarting both first and second order attacks. The
first countermeasure proposed a random initialization of every reg-
ister used in the convolution operation, with the random value
then subtracted after processing the final result. The second pro-
posal was to blind the intermediate convolution steps, each with a
separate random integer value. The final countermeasure was to
randomize the order of the array holding the non-zero polynomials.
Masking has also been applied to R-LWE-based schemes in sev-
eral works [26, 33, 34]. One obstacle when applying masking to
R-LWE-based schemes is that R-LWE itself only provides security
against chosen-plaintext attackers. For DPA it is essential that an
attacker can trigger decryption runs on his own as DPA attacks
require millions of power traces. That means that an attacker with
access to a decryption oracle does not have to bother with DPA
as he can simply break the cryptosystem mathematically. There
are indeed use-cases where an attacker can trigger decryption runs
but does not get to know the result of the decryption (i.e. DPA can
be performed but not chosen-ciphertext attacks), but they are rare.
Therefore it is more appropriate to applymasking to a R-LWE-based
scheme that is also secure against chosen-ciphertext attackers.
Higher-order security (i.e. security against an attacker with mul-
tiple probes) can be achieved using a higher-order masking scheme.
However, higher-order masking is usually expensive and there-
fore in practice it makes sense to combine masking with hiding
as higher-order DPA attacks are very susceptible to noise in the
power traces.
4.3 Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks
Errors can be intentionally introduced to a system via fault attacks,
but they may also arise as a natural consequence of the mathemat-
ical constructs of the implementation, for example, calculations
that have permissible error rates. When such events occur, an error
recovery mechanism will detect the error and instantiate a new
calculation. Hence traditional error correction codes can be used
for fault error detection (and correction).
The use of the concurrent error detection (CED) technique has been
proposed so that the normal execution of the algorithm is suppressed
to avoid any un-intentional leakage of secret values when a fault
occurs. One way of doing that is to have duplication of hardware so
that in case of a mismatch of results from the two an error detection
is reported. Another possibility is re-computation on the same
hardware. The first approach is resource expensive while the second
one has high execution overhead. In [5], various countermeasures
against fault attacks for software implementations of popular lattice-
based signatures are considered. Their effectiveness and overhead
is evaluated for schemes including GLP, BLISS, ring-TESLA and
GPV-NTRU.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Although lattice based primitives have so far demonstrated re-
silience against quantum attacks, their implementation on existing
commodity hardware and custom hardware will be susceptible to
physical attacks. These vulnerabilities need to be addressed be-
fore LBC can be considered as a replacement for the public key
cryptography suites used today. This work surveys known attacks
on LBC constructions including power analysis, timing attacks
and fault attacks, all of which could be a potential threat to lattice
based implementations. In terms of side channel leakages, power
is an important consideration. For software implementations on
commodity hardware timing attack vulnerabilities are critical to
address since ensuring constant timing for some algorithms, if at
all possible, might result in a significant performance penalty.
Most of the countermeasures proposed to date for LBC schemes
address a specific threat as they emerge (with no consideration
for other threats/ countermeasures simultaneously). Typical hid-
ing/blinding countermeasures include masking, constant time ex-
ecution, randomization and fault detection. Efforts to benchmark
the overhead of one or more of these countermeasures remain lim-
ited and are critical to rationalize the practicality of their adoption.
There is a wealth of useful techniques to learn from traditional
physical attack-resistant cryptographic designs used today but as
new lattice-based designs emerge and the volume of their deploy-
ment increases, further new attacks will most likely surface and this
will continue to be an important area of research going forward.
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